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Nietzsche and Darwin
Babette Babich

As a natural scientist however, one should get out of one’s human corner. … in
nature it is not distress which rules but abundance, squandering, indeed to the
point of senselessness. The struggle for survival is only an exception, a
temporary restriction of the will to life; the great and small battles turn around us
on preponderance, on growth and expansion, on power, corresponding to that will
to power that is indeed the will of life.
— Nietzsche, The Gay Science, §349
At some future period, not very distant as measured by centuries, the civilised
races of man will almost certainly exterminate and replace throughout the world
the savage races. At the same time the anthropomorphous apes, as Professor
Schaaffhausen has remarked, will no doubt be exterminated. The break will then
be rendered wider, for it will intervene between man in a more civilised state, as
we may hope, than the Caucasian, and some ape as low as a baboon, instead of as
at present between the negro or Australian and the gorilla.
Darwin, The Descent of Man (1874), p. 201

Abstract
I argue against the popular view of Nietzsche as Darwinist and focusing on the then-historical context for both
Nietzsche and Darwin, I concur with other Nietzsche scholars who have also noted that other authors worked in
Nietzsche’s thinking in association with Darwin, not only Spencer and Malthus but also Roux and Haeckel among
others which also for Nietzsche included Empedocles and other ancient scientists. I argue for the cogency of
Nietzsche’s condemnation of Darwin’s views but note that he continue to associated with Darwin owing to Darwin’s
racism, often conflated with Nietzsche’s notion of rank-order. I conclude with an emphasis on style and Nietzsche’s
reading of antiquity to highlight the distinction he sought to make between the popular ideal of the higher human
(which he called the last man) and a perspective beyond the human, the post-human, the Übermensch.

Whose Darwin? Which Nietzsche?
It is commonly supposed that Nietzsche was a Darwinian. This assumption also constitutes the
mainstream view and to be mainstream is rather like (but not completely like—this is a
metaphor) the selective pressure of nature: very nearly the only game in town. To be the only one
is what the mainstream is all about. Thus we argue metaphorically that mainstream views
“vanquish” other views, be it in science or philosophy or history or just pop culture, a triumph
that is, analogically speaking, a quasi-sign of divine grace, speaking as Calvin would speak of
“grace.” So too, so the argument went in the economy before capitalism turned out to require
1

massive bail-outs from public resources, just to shore it up against its own failures, in the case of
the economy it was supposed that viable enterprise vanquished the competition.
The eliminative dynamics of this grace accords with the “exterminator’s” analogy as Charles
Darwin uses it in 1874 to predict the extinction of species, human and otherwise:
At some future period, not very distant as measured by centuries, the civilised races of
man will almost certainly exterminate and replace throughout the world the savage
races. At the same time the anthropomorphous apes, as Professor Schaaffhausen 1 has
remarked, will no doubt be exterminated. 2
Nor and to be sure, just considering the fate of today’s gorillas and other primates down to the
slow loris, was Darwin wrong about the competitive outcome of the particular struggle for
survival he describes. If we are to go by the fate of the chimpanzee and the orangutan (as all
anthropoid apes are on one side or the other of the brink of extinction in the wild and all have
already been driven from the greater portion of their environmental range, and some species that
explorers could count in Darwin’s day are already long extinct), 3 that is to say, if we take his
own prediction literally, Darwin must be judged correct.
Note that I am still talking about the evolutionary success of mainstream views but be it science
or philosophy or the mutable field that is called ‘theory,’ as “dominant” points of view or not

1

Hermann Schaffhausen was a German physiologist and comparative anatomist at the University of Bonn who
was among the founders of today’s discipline of paleo-anthropology. Elsewhere Darwin acknowledges, among
others, Schaaffhausen, as those who anticipate his theory of natural selection: “Here is a curious thing, a Mr.
Pat. Matthew, a Scotchman, published in 1830 a work on Naval Timber & Arboriculture, & in appendix to this,
he gives most clearly but very briefly in half-dozen paragraphs our view of natural selection. It is most complete
case of anticipation. He published extracts in G. Chronicle: I got Book, & have since published letter,
acknowledging that I am fairly forestalled.— Yesterday I heard from Lyell that a German Dr Schaffhausen has
sent him a pamphet published some years ago, in which same View is nearly anticipated but I have not yet seen
this pamphet.— My Brother, who is very sagacious man, always said you will find that some one will have
been before you.—“ Darwin to Wallace, May 18th 1860. Ian Tattersall argues that it is odd that the discovery of
the Neanderthal bones in 1856 and Schaffhausen’s published anatomical account of these in the ‘Little
Feldhoffer grotto” near Dusseldorf would not (in fact) have come to Darwin’s attention (perhaps and indeed as
Darwin’s letter here to Wallace attests, via Lyell). See Tattersall, “Charles Darwin and Human Evolution,” Evo
Edu Outreach, 2 (2009): 28–34.

2

Darwin, The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex (New York: D. Appleton, 1874), p. 201.

3

Extinction, if science popularizers prefer to point to the adaptability of infectious organisms or cockroaches, etc.
And indeed the escalation of pesticide use counts as one of the soundest confirmations of natural selection. So
too the generation of antibiotic-resistant pathogens.
2

(paralleling Paul and Anne Ehrlich’s name for humanity as the dominant species), 4 might does
not make right, even when the “mainstream” press continues to dismiss, refusing to print or
better still refusing to footnote or, heaven forbid!, even to mention dissonant views. As a family
friend once said dramatically in less tolerant times after a son had married a non-Jewish girl,
He’s dead to me. We still do this in our university professions. In philosophy, for example
where the mainstream is the analytic mode even when professing about typically continental
types like Nietzsche, some professors, and Brian Leiter is among them, in fact he has an entire
blog that is all about this called the Gourmet Philosophy Report, caution their students about
what names to include in (and thus exclude from) their bibliographies.
This point about pruning one’s bibliography is not a sidetrack. Instead it bears directly on the
topic and is thus relevant for the philosophy and history of science and ideas because Darwin
himself deployed this very same and very carefully “selective” sensibility.
Darwin thus mentioned some and famously failed to mention many others who had been
influential on his thinking or who offered parallel, competing, or alternative views. Nor is it
surprising that a great many Darwin controversies turn on this very same failure to mention.
This is in part (but not only) because precedence is where it’s at when it comes to scientific (and
everyday) fame. We will return to Darwin’s failure to give credit where it was due (and to
overstate it, thus putting his contemporaries off the scent (as has been argued that it is this that
Darwin when he credits Malthus).
Despite the popular view, the identification of Nietzsche as a Darwinian contradicts Nietzsche’s
overt or explicit criticisms of Darwin 5 but most importantly contra the substance of his own
thinking.

4

Paul Ehrlich and Anne Ehrlich, The Dominant Animal: Human Evolution and the Environment (Washington,
DC: Island Press, 2008).

5

Richardson, Nietzsche’s New Darwinism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) as well as his “Nietzsche
contra Darwin,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LXV, 3 (2002): 537-575. See too Greg Moore,
Nietzsche, Biology, and Metaphor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). Moore gives an excellent
overview of the context of the German reception of Darwin, but see too, usefully centering on the theme of
Rée’s Spencer (and only thence to Darwin), Robin Small, “What Nietzsche Did During the Science Wars,” in
Brobjer and Moore, eds., Nietzsche and the Sciences (Aldershot: Avebury, 2004), pp. 155-170. Small notes that
“Nietzsche concentrates not on the idea of natural selection … but rather on the struggle for existence” but
Small’s distinction elides the role of struggle in Darwin’s own writings as the very mechanism of natural
3

Now it is true that no mainstream philosopher worth his or her mainstream salt has ever let the
text — that is to say, the trivially hermeneutic detail of what Nietzsche actually said — get in the
way of anything. Still the facts can help us. Nietzsche opposes or precisely makes fun of Darwin
from the first of his early Untimely Meditations. Writing of David Strauss, the naturalist
theologian:
He announces with admirable frankness that he is no longer a Christian, but he does not
wish to disturb anyone’s peace of mind; it seems to him contradictory to found an
association in order to overthrow an association — which is in fact not so very
contradictory. With a rude contentment he covers himself in the hairy cloak of our apegenealogists and praises Darwin as one of the greatest benefactors of mankind — but it
confuses us to see that his ethics are constructed entirely independently of the question:
“What is our conception of the world?”
Strauss has not yet even learned that no idea can ever make men better or more moral,
and that preaching morals is as easy as finding grounds for them is difficult; his task
was much rather to take the phenomena of human goodness, compassion, love and selfabnegation, which do in fact exist, and derive and explain them from his Darwinist
presuppositions [...] according to Darwin, he is precisely a creature of nature and
nothing else, and has evolved to the height of being a man by quite other laws:
precisely, in fact, by always forgetting that other creatures similar to him possessed
equivalent rights, precisely by feeling himself the stronger and gradually eliminating the
other, weaker examples of his species? (UM I: 7; my emphasis)
As it goes with continental philosophy, so it goes with Schaffhausen’s Neanderthals
(Schaffhausen compared the Neanderthals the native American “flatheads” — and there is an

selection, hence Darwin himself points to Malthus as his own decided inspiration, a claim which has launched
any small number of tempest in a very closed Darwinian teapot. Thus Small despite his attention to the context
of the German debate quite mistakes Nietzsche’s point when he says with reference to Nietzsche’s Twilight of
the Idols, in the section entitled (hard to miss!) “Anti-Darwin,” quite mildly, and therefore quite devastatingly:
“Nietzsche’s comments here are not particularly well-directed — for example, his observation that nature
exhibits “profusion, riches, even absurd squandering” is not only consistent with Darwin but in fact part of his
argument for the universality of the struggle for existence.” Small then goes on to dismiss Nietzsche’s
concluding warning “One ought not mistake Malthus for Darwin.” (TI, Anti-Darwin) as “inevitable and quite
conventional.” (Small, “What Nietzsche Did During the Science Wars,” p. 166) Thus Small, like Richardson
and many other analytic writers, manages to have his Darwinian steak while carving it up with Nietzschean
implements, precisely because at stake for such authors is never Nietzsche’s critique of morality (this is how
one might read his genealogy of morals — namely and as Nietzsche’s subtitle would suggest in a polemical
voice) but Nietzsche’s genealogy very flatly interpreted as evolutionary tractatus. Thus Small explains that
“Nietzsche’s account acknowledges the importance of materiality in the evolution of morality, and thereby of
contingency, insofar as this is located in what escapes the power of reason to extend its former realm over
reality in general.” p. 167. The problem, and it is not a small one, is that Nietzsche is not in fact offering an
account of the “evolution of morality.” By contrast of course, Paul Rée was engaged in just an enterprise — as,
of course, Small knows very well indeed. See Small, Nietzsche and Rée: A Star Friendship (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2005).
4

importantly forgotten world of research there, even for John Gray, in parsing that term), and so it
goes with the aboriginal peoples Darwin observed on his voyages, and so it goes with nonhuman primates and other, perhaps all other, animals as well.
And shall we name this evolution? Shall we call it the survival of the fittest?
Fitness, which we called grace above is what is at issue. By their fruits you shall know them.
Nietzsche’s problem with the theologian David Strauss is that he was a Hegelian and a naturalist
and a Darwinian. And all these things go together for Nietzsche. And to this Hegelian, naturalist,
Darwinian constellation we can add natural science itself in certain of its general tendencies
where he writes (Nietzsche is fond of using this language for science): “Die Verdummung, auch
in die Wissenschaft“ [The stupidification, in the sciences too] which for Nietzsche is to be set
parallel to „die Verehrung Darwins.“ [the admiration of Darwin] (KSA 11, 131) Thus in Beyond
Good and Evil, Nietzsche can point to evolution as an instantiation of what he takes to be natural
science’s fondness for what he describes as the „least possible force” together with the ”greatest
possible stupidity.” (BGE §14)
Unlike the very coordinate Hegel and Darwin (as Nietzsche underscores in The Gay Science:
„Ohne Hegel, Kein Darwin“ — that is, „Without Hegel, no Darwin“ or just a bit more precisely
said, echoing the ethnic Vaudeville joke about the urban Chinese cleaner’s No tickee, no laundry:
“No Hegel, no Darwin” [GS §367]), Nietzsche was not interested in either the survival or the
perishing of the “Species” but much rather in what he called “rank-order” (cf. KSA 13, 480), a
conception that needs explaining for by it Nietzsche refers to the very idea of genius, of the
height of culture (i.e., ancient Greece by contrast with Germany), as found in the artist, the poet,
especially as conceived on the model of the Greeks or the troubadours as knight-poet. And this,
as we shall see, was the heart of his critique of Darwin, in concord with his analysis of the threat
of nihilism: “the lowest values” he writes in a non-Darwinian, non-evolutionary declaration, tend
to flourish, while and by autonomic contrast with Darwin, “the highest devalue themselves”
(KSA 13, 321)
In this way, the mere textual happenstance that Nietzsche criticizes Darwin or rather
unmistakably — again, let me correct that: seemingly, apparently, unmistakably — writes contra
5

Darwin, including just as explicitly as one pleases a long aphorism in Twilight of the Idols
entitled “Anti-Darwin” (one would think this would be hard to mistake: one would be wrong), is
irrelevant to the Darwinian Nietzscheans (and I include those who denounce as well as those
who celebrate this so-called Darwinism).
What Nietzsche said is rather less important than what he “meant” to say or “should” have said
or “really said” (the really here means properly parsed) once one paws through (or re-writes)
Nietzsche’s unfortunate verbiage. John Richardson, my very mainstream analytic friend and
New York City colleague, has written a book entitled Nietzsche’s New Darwinism 6 (this is a riff,
I need to say this as I suspect that it may not be obvious, on the “non-Darwinian revolution,”
noting here that such ‘revolutions’ are often all the Darwinism one needs). And in what I regard
as a true tour de force, New Zealand friend Robin Small (who also happens to enjoy broadly
mainstream formation and writes in this fashion) manages to parse Nietzsche’s “Anti-Darwin” as
proving just the opposite. 7 In Small’s reading, Nietzsche should be seen, actually, as an “ultra-

6

See, again, Richardson, Nietzsche’s New Darwinism.

7

Small, “What Nietzsche Did During the Science Wars,” p. 167. Although Small notes that “Nietzsche
concentrates not on the idea of natural selection … but rather on the struggle for existence” (ibid.), Small’s
distinction elides the role of struggle in Darwin’s own writings as the very mechanism of natural selection,
hence Darwin himself points to Malthus as his own decided inspiration, a claim which has launched any small
number of tempest in a very closed Darwinian teapot. Indeed, Small despite his attention to the context of the
German debate quite mistakes Nietzsche’s point when he says with reference to Nietzsche’s Twilight of the
Idols, in the section entitled “Anti-Darwin,” quite mildly, and therefore quite devastatingly: “Nietzsche’s
comments here are not particularly well-directed — for example, his observation that nature exhibits
“profusion, riches, even absurd squandering” is not only consistent with Darwin but in fact part of his argument
for the universality of the struggle for existence.” Small goes on to dismiss Nietzsche’s concluding warning
“One ought not mistake Malthus for Darwin” (TI, Anti-Darwin) as “inevitable and quite conventional.” (Small,
p. 166) In this way, Small and Richardson and many other analytic writers, manages to have their Darwinian
steak while carving it up with Nietzschean implements, precisely because what matters for such authors is never
Nietzsche’s critique of morality (this is how one might read his genealogy of morals — namely and as
Nietzsche’s subtitle would suggest in a polemical voice) but Nietzsche’s genealogy very flatly interpreted as
evolutionary tractatus. Thus Small explains that “Nietzsche’s account acknowledges the importance of
materiality in the evolution of morality, and thereby of contingency, insofar as this is located in what escapes
the power of reason to extend its former realm over reality in general.” p. 167. The problem, and it is not an
insignificant problem, is that Nietzsche is not offering an account of the “evolution of morality.” Paul Rée, by
contrast, was engaged in just an enterprise (and thus Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals begins with a diatribe
contra Rée’s undertaking) as Small himself has detailed. See Small, Nietzsche and Rée: A Star Friendship
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
6

Darwinist.” 8 Along this continuum, there are others, such as Werner Stegmaier, who similarly
insists that Nietzsche was a “decided Darwinist throughout every phase of his creative work.” 9
And therewith such mainstream philosophical analyses accord with popular accounts linking
Nietzsche with Darwin along with more political accounts emphasizing both Nietzsche’s and
Darwin’s influences on Hitler, convicting Nietzsche and Darwin of an horrific political
Wirkungsgeschichte, maybe, so goes the argument, not Nietzsche’s or Darwin’s “fault” in the
sense of intention or will, but nonetheless influential and therefore duly culpable and
consequently “dangerous.” 10
Such readings, philosophical, popular, and political ignore Nietzsche’s overt statements contra
Darwin because they have to do so in order to function. 11 The same distinctions can be found in
those who read Darwin either as a racist and proto-facist (using similar arguments contra Darwin
as are used against Nietzsche — thus both Nietzsche and Darwin can be happily hoisted on the
same racist, proto-fascist and Nazi petard). One proceeds as one commonly does, this is a
standard because standardizing move in mainstream scholarship, by simply claiming that one
reads “sloppily” if one draws any conclusion other than the received or accepted view. And to
be sure: this is the point of having a received view. Thus one argues against Darwin’s racism
despite its patent character, i.e., in spite of the text, despite what Darwin unfortunately did say,
because the great majority of academics (including, to be sure, the current speaker and even

8

Small, “What Nietzsche Did During the Science Wars,” p. 167.

9

Werner Stegmaier, “Darwin, Darwinismus, Nietzsche: Zum Problem der Evolution,” Nietzsche-Studien 16
(1987): 247-275; here p. 269.

10

Richard Weikart, From Darwin to Hitler: Evolutionary Ethics, Eugenics, and Racism in Germany (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2004) and Weikart, Hitler’s Ethic: The Nazi Pursuit of Evolutionary Progress (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2009) is the most recent example of this trend but see for an historical introduction, Tracy
Strong, “Introduction,” to Strong, ed., Friedrich Nietzsche, (Avebury: Continuum, 2009). There are exceptions
to such historical readings: see in particular, Lewis Call: “Anti-Darwin, Anti-Spencer: Friedrich Nietzsche’s
Critique of Darwin and ‘Darwinism’, Hist. Sci. xxxvi (1998): 1-22.

11

I have written on some of the complexities behind Nietzsche’s reading of Darwin and more generally
physiology and biology in Babich, Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Science: Reflecting Science in the Light of Art and
Life (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984). See for a broader discussion of the notion of progress,
Wolf Gorch Zachriat, Die Ambivalenz des Fortschritts: Friedrich Nietzsches Kulturkritik (Berlin: Akademie
Verlag, 2001). I also discuss, more broadly, the phenomenon of this particular ambivalence in an online
interview and in response to Nicholas Birns’ incisive and insightful questions: “Between Impossible Wishes”
[http://www.nietzschecircle.com/AGONIST/2009_07/PDFs/AgonistJUL2009Birns.pdf] and
7

Nietzsche himself as he himself underscores: albeit assuming his critique of Darwin) tend more
to agree with rather than to disagree with Darwin.
The problem is being either pro-Darwin or Anti-Darwin in Nietzsche’s terms. To spare an
explication of Nietzsche’s antipathy to the language of pro and con, we can say that what is at
issue is the “great man” theory of science (and philosophy and history in general), a theory that is
as pernicious as it is unavoidable: it is the heart of the Whig or presentist tendency in mainstream
history, including and still dominant today, the history of science.
If, so goes the “great man” reconstructionist schema, Darwin is a “great man,” 12 and if great men
are not, and by definition, racist/fascist/proto-Nazi, then Darwin cannot have been
racist/fascist/proto-Nazi. In the same way, if one also happens to wish to make the mainstream
case “for” Nietzsche (one way or another), one arranges one’s terms, this is what arguments and
argumentative strategies are good for, until they come out as one would have them come out. 13
From such an interested perspective, re-visioning Nietzsche appropriately is not all that hard,
offending passages are presented as “really” otherwise than they appear, Nietzsche’s own great
man status (which means that and in the end Nietzsche pretty much thinks what the interpreter
thinks) plays a role.
But things are far more complicated. And they always are but in this case we are dealing with
two authors who happen to inspire dramatically opposed readings. As with Nietzsche, the
problem with Darwin on evolution (or on breeding and racial differences) is all about what one
takes to be key to Darwin’s position. Here although one can agree to allow some differences, I
am going to take it that the issue of natural selection will be key and that the issue of fitness,
however rendered, will be essential.
The late and great Ernst Mayr — great both in the context of biology and the philosophy of
biology and who has also been called the Darwin of the 20th century — observed in his One
12

I following Robert Bernasconi here who pointed to this argument as it may be found in the literature on
Heidegger and Nazism. Bernasconi also writes on race. See Bernasconi, “Who Invented the Concept of Race?
Kant’s Role in the Enlightenment Construction of Race,” in Bernasconi, ed., Race (Oxford: Blackwell, 2012),
pp. 11-36.

13

And philosophers are good at this, thus I have heard the complaint, that I use logic and am thus myself to be
called an analytic philosopher, as if one were forbidden the use of logic as a continental philosopher. This is
(trivial, as opposed to what Alasdair MacIntyre distinguishes as “great”) silliness.
8

Long Argument that we tend today to simplify Darwin by speaking of his theory of evolution as
if this were any sort of unitary theory. 14 “In reality,” Mayr emphasizes, “Darwin’s ‘theory’ of
evolution was a whole bundle of theories, and it is impossible to discuss Darwin's evolutionary
thought constructively if one does not distinguish its various components.” 15 Nor is Mayr alone
in insisting upon such a emphatic distinction. Even if few philosophers are precise enough to
keep company with him, nearly every biologist will emphasize this, certainly my own biology
teachers at Stony Brook did so.
It is the issue of natural selection that is problematic for Nietzsche precisely as rendered, and
Nietzsche challenges precisely this articulation, as the “Kampf um’s Dasein”, i.e., in Darwin’s
English, as “the struggle for life.” In fact numerous scholars who work on the history of the life
sciences in the 19th century or else the genetics community in Germany at the turn of the last
century, have claimed that the focus on the “Kampf um’s Dasein” stems from Ernst Haeckel 16 or

indeed other scientists, some of whom were very influential on Nietzsche, like Wilhelm Roux,

who also gets the word “Kampf” into the title of his 1881 Der Kampf der Teile im Organismus 17 as
14

Ernst Mayr, One Long Argument: Charles Darwin and the Genesis of Modern Evolutionary Thought
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993).

15

Mayr, One Long Argument, p. 36. Mayr goes on to partition “Darwin's evolutionary paradigm into five
theories, but of course others might prefer a different division. The selected theories are by no means all of
Darwin's evolutionary theories; others were, for instance, sexual selection, pangenesis, effect of use and disuse,
and character divergence. However when later authors referred to Darwin's theory they invariably had a
combination of some of the following five theories in mind: 1. Evolution as such. This is the theory that the
world is not constant or recently created nor perpetually cycling, but rather is steadily changing, and that
organisms are transformed in time.
2. Common descent. This is the theory that every group of organisms
descended from a common ancestor, and that all groups of organisms, including animals, plants, and
microorganisms, ultimately go back to a single origin of life on earth. 3. Multiplication of species. This theory
explains the origin of the enormous organic diversity. It postulates that species multiply, either by splitting into
daughter species or by "budding," that is, by the establishment of geographically isolated founder populations
that evolve into new species.
4. Gradualism. According to this theory, evolutionary change takes place
through the gradual change of populations and not by the sudden (saltational) production of new individuals that
represent a new type. 5. Natural selection. According to this theory, evolutionary change comes about through
the abundant production of genetic variation in every generation. The relatively few individuals who survive,
owing to a particularly well-adapted combination of inheritable characters, give rise to the next generation.”
Ibid.

16

See in particular, Robert J. Richards, The Tragic Sense of Life: Ernst Haeckel and the Struggle over
Evolutionary Thought (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1881). But see also Timothy Lenoir, The Strategy
of Life. Teleology and Mechanics in Nineteenth-Century German Biology (Chicago: University of Chicago,
1982).

17

Wilhelm Roux, Der Kampf der Teile im Organismus (Leipzig: Engelmann, 1881).
9

well as William Rolph

18

and, and this is perhaps the most incendiary claim, like Rudolf Virchow

(who was arguably rather less influential). All are held to have influenced Nietzsche’s reception
of Darwin. On the one hand, all such claims are “true” or factual to the very extent that Nietzsche
had a keen interest in the then-current debate on biological development and Darwinian
evolution, especially with regard to Hartman 19 (and as he was also more broadly interested in the
whole panoply of the sciences of his day). The problem is the other hand and this hand (and
foot) goes to the heart of source scholarship as such, a problem Nietzsche for his own part
regarded as our nigh-on incorrigible because very scholarly tendency to come up philologically
short indeed and as philologists, even schooled with the best.
To begin with: one “positive” citation (or even two or ten) does not exhaust what is always
inevitably a ‘climate’ of influence, what is at times and infamously called, because we do this in
English, the Zeitgeist. Hence the particular provenance of Nietzsche’s invocation of the Kampf
um’s Dasein is tendentious to the very obvious extent that Heinrich Georg Bronn (1800-1862), a
German paleontologist, fossil zoologist, and natural historian dedicated a considerable bit of time
at the end of his life to paying Darwin the kindness of translating Darwin’s 1859 publication of
On the Origin of the Species by Means of Natural Selection into German, just one year later, in
1860. 20 Alas, at least for history, Darwin had no thought of returning the favor by encouraging
the reception of Bronn’s research in England. Here the relevant point for discussion is that
Bronn rendered Darwin’s subtitle: or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life
as oder Erhaltung der vervollkommneten Rassen im Kampfe um’s Daseyn. Thus the phrase
Kampf um’s Dasein is very literally or even ultra-Darwinist in a German context just to the

18
19

20

William Henry Rolph, Biologische Probleme zugleich als Versuch zur Entwicklung einer Rationellen Ethik
(Leipzig: Engelmann, 1884).

Eduard von Hartmann, Wahrheit und Irrthum des Darwinismus. Eine kritische Darstellung der organischen
Entwickelungslehre Berlin: 1875).

Darwin, On the Origin of the Species by Means of Natural Selection; or the Preservation of Favoured Races in
the Struggle for Life (London: John Murray, 1859) translated by Heinrich G. Bronn as Über die Entstehung der
Arten um Their- und Pflanzen-Reich durch natürliche Züchtung, oder Erhaltung der vervollkemmneten Rassen
im Kampfe um’s Daseyn (Stuttgart: E. Schweizerbart, 1860). As Sander Gliboff reminds us, “Bronn’s version
of The Origin of the Species appeared in 1860, mere months after the original. It was the first foreign-language
edition on the market, and it immediately provoked debates and challenged German scholars to think about
morphology, paleontology, embryology, and other biological disciplines in new ways.” Gliboff, H.G. Bronn,
Ernst Haeckel, and the Origins of German Darwinism A Study in Translation and Transformation, (Cambridge:
MIT Press, 2008), p. 4.
10

extent that it renders Darwin’s own Struggle for Life, the phrase often yoked with the “struggle
for survival” characteristic of what is often named “Victorian” or “Social” Darwinism (in order
not to have to label Darwin with it).
It was the competitive struggle for life that Nietzsche refused in Darwin’s selective sense: and
this may surprise those who find Nietzsche an enthusiast of all things bloody and war-like. Isn’t
the “struggle for life,” the “Kampfe um’s Daseyn,” the very meaning of the will to power? Yes
and no. Yes, if a tension or contest or agon is what is intended. Decidedly not, if the result of that
contest is “selection” in Darwin’s sense, “preserving” as Darwin speaks of preservation, the
“favoured races,” i.e., what Bronn translates as Vervollkommnung (rendering the “favoured”
among the races, i.e., as a progressive perfecting tendency). For Nietzsche emphasizes that the
will to power, ‘Verily’ as his Zarathustra says, is to be found everywhere but that it hardly
distinguishes excellences and is found perhaps most strikingly among the least among us.
“Hearken now unto my word, ye wisest ones! Test it seriously, whether I have crept into the heart of life
itself, and into the roots of its heart!
Wherever I found a living thing, there found I Will to Power; and even in the will of the servant found I the
will to be master. (Z II: On Self-Overcoming)

In other words, Nietzsche was fairly sure that (like the strongest, i.e., and the most “favoured”),
the weakest too were replete with “the will to be master.” But not only this. As Nietzsche
emphasizes, paralleling Hegel, contra Hegel, it will be the slaves, the weaker who also qua
weaker (this is Nietzsche’s brief contra slave-morality) and always but always accede to mastery.
Nietzsche differs from Hegel in that he regard the weak and the mediocre as continuing to be
weak and mediocre, claiming that it is only with and including such weakness and such
mediocrity that humanity has come to be what it is and indeed to be as rich and as interesting as
it is. When it comes to dominance, to being mainstream, and hence to survival and perdurance,
there is, Nietzsche argues, only one type who does and can manage to survive in the face of all
odds: “the incurably mediocre…” [die unheilbar Mittelmässigen] (BGE §262)
This last pronouncement appears in Beyond Good and Evil and literally addresses nothing more
Darwinian than the question of the “species” in the section entitled “What is Noble.” He even
11

includes a very Darwinian discussion of “breeding” and of “variations,” as of the conditions that
“favour” them, and it is not difficult to see how one might be inclined to take Nietzsche to be an
“ultra-Darwinist” if Nietzsche did not come to rather excessively anti-Darwinian conclusions:
emphasizing

that

“nothing

is

capable

of

enduring”

—

to

repeat

Nietzsche’s

indictment/celebration of mediocrity one more time — “beyond the day after tomorrow, one
species of humanity excepted, the incurably mediocre.” (BGE §262) When Nietzsche goes on in
On the Genealogy of Morals to talk about the slave revolt in morality as a victory over the nobles
he endeavors to make the same point, again, and at greater length.
Contra Darwin, Nietzsche’s claim is that a suspiciously providential thinking survives under the
guise of Darwinism, thus Nietzsche emphasizes the Darwinian habit of asserting the connection
between “happiness” [Glück] and “virtue” [Tugend] (KSA 12, 457)
The insight into the ultimate tendency of the slave to triumph, and to triumph every time, over
the strong, over the noble — which noble is, in the end, anything but swift on his or her
calculating or defensive intellectual feet, and thus always fails to cover his or her back so that in
the Hobbesian war of all against all, it is never the “stronger” who wins but always the weaker, à
la Swift’s Lilliputians or à la the social contract. As Nietzsche fills in the bits Hobbes leaves
blank: “they are more numerous, they are also smarter.” (EH, Streifzüge, §14)
All this is very Darwinian, even “ultra-Darwinian” as Small contends, apart from Nietzsche’s
conclusion that the favoured are not the fittest, not the best, but only the most common, the
vulgar.
This is the key to Nietzsche’s conception of the ingenious resources of ressentiment and the
world changing efficacy of the ascetic ideal, i.e., the human-making achievement of discipline
and intelligence that drives his reflections contra a range of British and English “psychologists”
or natural historians of morality (this would include Mill and Spencer but also his friend Paul
Rée as Nietzsche nicely explains in his preface to On the Genealogy of Morals: A Polemic).
As Nietzsche writes, Darwin hat den Geist vergessen. (EH, Streifzüge, §14) “Darwin forgot the
mind — this,” he adds “is English!” What Darwin overlooks is the advantage of mind, i.e.,
intellect, i.e., spirit, as the very specific advantage of the slavishly moral, greater number.
12

But in addition, for this would make of Nietzsche little other than a more puckish champion of
the Peter Principle, i.e., the well-known tendency of power to concentrate in the least competent,
Nietzsche took especial issue with the key mechanism of natural selection: namely the dark and
dismal narrowness of nature’s books, the spare economy of the world (this grey outlook is the
source of the famous description of economics as the “dismal science”) by Nietzsche’s favorite
English historian, Thomas Carlyle. 21 In his book Nature’s Economy, the environmental historian,
Donald Worster, draws out this aspect of Darwin detailing, in an understatedly non-presentist
opposition to the tradition of hagiography that has Darwin as a liberal minded democrat of our
age, promoting the equality of all humanity, Europeans and original native inhabitants alike,22
the extreme and visceral repugnance Darwin conceived with regard to the life style and the
physical aspect of the autochthonous or aboriginal inhabitants of Tierra del Fuego.
But we can go Worster one better by quoting Darwin’s 1932 remarks from his Voyage of the
Beagle, remarks that echo the epigraph already quoted once above:
While entering we were saluted in a manner becoming the inhabitants of this savage and forbidding land.
A group of Fuegians partly concealed by the entangled forest, were perched on a wild point overhanging
the sea; and as we passed by, they sprang up and waving their tattered cloaks sent forth a loud and
sonorous shout. In the morning the captain sent a party to communicate with the Fuegians. . . . It was
without exception the most curious and interesting spectacle I ever beheld: I could not believe how wide
was the difference between a savage and civilized man: it is greater than between a domesticated and wild
animal, inasmuch as in man there is a greater power of improvement. The chief spokesman was old - and
appeared to be the head of the family; the three others were powerful young men about six feet high..
.The old man had a fillet of white feathers tied round his head, which partly confined his black, coarse,
and entangled hair. His face was crossed by two broad transverse bars; one, painted bright red, reached
21

Although Carlyle is alluding to Hobbes, and uses the term dismal in other contexts, the locus of this quote
derives from an occsional text given in 1849 with the wretched title, “The Nigger Question,” from Thomas
Carlyle, Miscellaneous Essays (London: Chapman and Hall, 1888), vol. 7, pp. 79-110. See for a discussion and
further references to this issue, Peter Groenewegen, “Thomas Carlyle, ‘The Dismal Science’, and the
Contemporary Political Economy of Slavery,” History of Economics Review, 34 (Summer 2001): 74-94. It is
not clear that the substance of current debates on ecology and economics in a global context have moved
beyond this perspective, on one side of the other.

22

But, as noted, Darwin certainly sees the races in terms fairly straightforwardly “Darwinian.” See too Diane B.
Paul, “Darwin, social Darwinism and eugenics,” in Jonathan Hodge and Gregory Radick, eds., The Cambridge
Companion to Darwin (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 214-239. See too: Steve
Jones, Darwin's Island: The Galapagos in the Garden of England (London: Little, Brown, 2009) and Adrian
Desmond and James Moore, Darwin's Sacred Cause: Race, Slavery and the Quest for Human Origins,
(London: Allen Lane, 2008)
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from ear to ear and included the upper lip; the other, white like chalk, extended above and parallel to the
first, so that even his eyelids were thus coloured. The other two men were ornamented by streaks of black
powder, made of charcoal …Their very attitudes were abject, and the expression of their countenances
distrustful, surprised, and startled. 23

Here it ought not be forgotten, although the political battle about this one of very many other and
similar historical colonializing details is far from over (how are colonies made? and how ought
we memorialize the consequences of the same?), is that not too far distant from the place where
Darwin described such a patently “unfavoured” race (as he described it), the extermination of the
native or aboriginal Tasmanians was proceeding apace.
As John Gray, we mentioned him above in connection with Schaffhausen from whom Darwin
took so much, and his reference to the American “flatheads,” who uses the example to illustrate
his Straw Dogs, 24 emphasizes, one had not (not quite) decided that such wretches counted for
anything more than servitude and rape and elimination or extermination. The aboriginal
Tasmanians (parallel to the aboriginal Fuegians or Australians in Darwin’s references above):
had been used for slave labour and sexual pleasure, tortured and mutilated. They had been
hunted like vermin and their skin had been sold for government bounty. When the males were
killed female survivors were turned loose with the heads of their husbands tied around their
necks. Males who were not killed were usually castrated. Children were clubbed to death. When
the last indigenous Tasmanian male, William Lanner, died in 1869, his grave was opened by a
Member of the Royal Society of Tasmania, Dr George Stokell, who made a tobacco pouch from
his skin. 25

23

Darwin, December 17th, 1832. Darwin later recounts a closer visit: “These poor wretches were stunted in their
growth, their hideous faces bedaubed with white paint, their skins filthy and greasy, their hair entangled, their
voices discordant, and their gestures violent. Viewing such men, one can hardly make one's self believe that
they are fellow-creatures, and inhabitants of the same world. It is a common subject of conjecture what pleasure
in life some of the lower animals can enjoy: how much more reasonably the same question may be asked with
respect to these barbarians! At night, five or six human beings, naked and scarcely protected from the wind and
rain of this tempestuous climate, sleep on the wet ground coiled up like animals. Whenever it is low water,
winter or summer, night or day, they must rise to pick shellfish from the rocks; and the women either dive to
collect sea-eggs, or sit patiently in their canoes, and with a baited hair-line without any hook, jerk out little fish.
If a seal is killed, or the floating carcass of a putrid whale is discovered, it is a feast; and such miserable food is
assisted by a few tasteless berries and fungi.” Etc.

24

John Gray, Straw Dogs: Thoughts on Humans and Other Animals (London: Granta Books, 2002).

25

Gray, Straw Dogs, p. 91. Gray cites: Lyndall Ryan, The Aboriginal Tasmanians, 2nd ed., (St Leonards: Allen &
Unwin, 1996).
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Now historians debate this, the Tasmanians much more vigorously than others, and as well they
might. 26 As Nietzsche would point out in his own remarks on history, the victorious have all the
evidence on their side. It is hard to point to the dead; and the many and grievous things one’s
forbears did to those lesser than our selves are lost to history. All things we take for granted
today were built on the backs of all such things. Great things, even and especially great things
are as Nietzsche reminds us, thoroughly soaked in blood and that for a long, long time — the
fruit of practices that simply went without saying, things never recorded. If some historians
estimate than some 6000 Tasmanians were alive in 1803 at the beginning of the conflicts with
the British settlers, and some say: 4000 and some say: 8000, what is indisputable is that
European colonialization proceeded apace and at the end of the day there were none — not in the
sense of the full-blooded Tasmanian — how convenient our politically correct language is, and
how deep-going, Nietzsche speaks of our unteachable down-deep (especially with regard to
women) as our ultra-stupidity, that is “our” still ongoing fear of miscegnation. If the native men
were killed and if at the same time the native women were kept and used sexually, their children
could still be counted as Tasmanian aborigines, ah but without the benefit of transmitting the full
genetic complement of their forbears. And in terms of natural selection this is indeed the
mechanism whereby some races come to be “favoured” over others. Like the grey squirrels
currently being hunted in England for the crime of interbreeding (they drive out the red coated
squirrels, say the English, as if the grey outcompeted them for nuts and such, but all the greys do
is interbreed, although this miscegenation is vigorously denied (they are another species they
say, like human and Neanderthals). What is certain is that the red is evidently recessive, though
English “greys” viewed with this New Yorker’s eyes, used as she is to the robust and very grey
greyness of American greys, have far more “red” traits, including coloring but also including
26

See Anne McMahon, ‘Tasmanian Aboriginal Women as Slaves’, Tasmanian Historical Research Association:
Papers and Proceedings, Vol 23, No 2, June 1976, pp. 44-49 as well as Ryan, The Aboriginal Tasmanians. See
too for the general notion of the “Aborigine,” Bain Attwood, The Making of Aborigines (Sydney: Allen and
Unwin, 1989). More recently for a specific focus, see Kay Merry, “The Cross-Cultural Relationships Between
the Sealers and the Tasmanian Aboriginal Women at Bass Strait and Kangaroo Island in the Early Nineteenth
Century.” Counterpoints Vol. 3, No. 1 (2003): 80-88. Further, see Mitchell Rolls, “The Changing Politics of
Miscegenation,” Aboriginal History, 29 (2005): 64-76 and for one among several reactionary responses — I say
reactionary just to the extent that the debate is now characterized as the “Historians War,” and is so in a
textbook sense: such things could not have happened, so they must not have happened: where are the history
books, how can one trust aboriginal accounts (a good question, were it not for the converse) — Keith
Windshuttle, The Fabrication of Aboriginal History: Volume One: Van Diemen's Land 1803-1847 (Paddington:
Macleay Press, 2002).
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morphological characteristics like the shape of their ears, tufted to boot, tail character and body
type, than English eyes evidently are able to see for themselves. I may be imagining things, for
far and wide, everyone (interested in the “squirrel question”) insists not: but I note that we are
talking about species change, one way or another and breeding (and selective pressures) are
never easy things to replicate in captivity.
What is certain is that the method currently in use in England is one well-known from the last
century: the effort is towards increasing Lebensraum, in this case: Lebensraum for the ‘native’
English red, and the means to be used to such an end is the killing of the greys. And don’t get me
wrong: I too favor the reds. The problem for me only concerns the “final” solution or cost of that
same favoring of the reds when it comes to kind of remedy or solution in use against the greys. 27
Like Manhattan on the Hudson, I do not know how many Indians lived in what we now call
Boston when most English colonists arrived and it is unclear exactly how many died by direct
extermination, slaughter and murder (if one refuses as some will do to count disease,
malnourishment, uprootedness, etc.), but any method of elimination is biologically effective.
Hence today there are as many “full-blooded” Indians living as they once did on the same locus
on the banks of a river they did not for their part call the Charles 28 as there are cougars and
wolves in greater Boston. There are no cougars today: none of these last non-human aboriginal
beings, who dwelt once upon these shores, gazes today upon the Boston’s New England harbor
or indeed its river. And what aboriginal humans there may be are not, so it goes in history, “fullblooded” Indians.
If the English do not want unmixed squirrels, the distinction of aboriginals as full-blooded
becomes both increasingly bootless as an issue over time and politically problematic as a
concept.
If, to return from Darwin’s dark visions of the selected fate of unfavoured races, Nietzsche
refuses the darkness, Darwin emphasizes just this dire note, lending it indeed to the economic
27

And indeed, this past July in London for a meeting I shall abbreviate as the Royal Music Society, and although
July should have been a great time to watch squirrels Russell Square, I visited the several different little square
parks in a good ambit about it, without seeing a single grey squirrel in any of them. Trees that grew into
glorious interconnectedness, highways vertical and horizontal for squirrels were solitary when I came.

28

Charles the 1st, named the river after himself.
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vision of ecology, as is expressed with rather more color in the popularizing vision: “nature red
in tooth and claw.”
It is this economic, existentially straitened vision that did not, for Nietzsche, square with what he
saw all around him. And if he argues famously against the Stoics’ ambition to live in concord
with the order of nature, by pointing to nature’s cruelty and utter lack of measure, he also
emphasizes over and over again — it is his image of the heart of existence as the Ur-Künstler or
what the ancient Greek nature philosophers called nous — nature’s profligate abundance.

On Truth and Stylizing
In the next section of this paper, I turn to address the more personal commonalities between the
two men. For both Darwin and Nietzsche have profited enormously from the cult of personality,
a cult that is arguably indistinguishable from scholarship and similarly indispensable for culture.
This cult Nietzsche took as the subject of his inaugural lecture on Homer in Basel, a lecture
exploring the so-called “Homer Question. For many of us, the entire problem consists in
grasping just exactly what the “Homer Question” would have been about for German
philologists and that from the inception of philology onwards. 29 The Homer Question turns out to
have nothing whatever in common with the Woman Question, the Irish Question, the Jewish
Question but only, and this “only” constitutes the antipode of complexity itself — with the
question of Who then was Homer?
Or still better said, Was there even, Was there ever, a Homer?
Regarded from a German point of view and no less from the art-historical (and indeed, if we
count Hume and Kant, philosophically “aesthetic”) perspective of style, Nietzsche’s lecture
would appear to turn upon biological and even architectural convention. The question of style is
the question of form, the very heart of the morphological (and as it turns out classically
29

I discuss this in a related context in the first section of Babich, “Towards a Critical Philosophy of Science:
Continental Beginnings and Bugbears, Whigs and Waterbears,” International Journal of the Philosophy of
Science, Vol. 24, No. 4 (December 2010): 343-391 and “On Nietzsche’s Judgment of Style and Hume’s
Quixotic Taste: On the Science of Aesthetics and ‘Playing’ the Satyr,” The Journal of Nietzsche Studies, 43.2
(2012): 240-259.
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hermeneutic) issue of demarcation and identification. Which bone is this? what fossa is cognate
with what? turns out to be related to the attribution of fragments to ancient authors. Where
indeed (and here we can draw a connection here between Ivan Illich and Nietzsche but also
between Nietzsche and Ludwik Fleck would ancient philosophy and philology have been failing
such elementary intimations of style? 30
There is a good deal more to Nietzsche’s invocation of style and taste, inasmuch as he used it to
challenge the very scientificity or scholarly rigor of his own profession in terms of the genetic
and generic, i.e., of the classification and distinction of kinds (in this case, of Homeric and nonHomeric texts or fragments). 31 But here I limit myself to the concept of style as such as it also
very relevant to the history and philosophy of science both with reference to August Crombie as
Ian Hacking rightly notes but also in the debates around Kuhn in the history and philosophy of
science. 32 This is particularly so, as I have argued, if one counts in another biologically minded

30

See Catherine Osborne, Rethinking Early Greek Philosophy (London: Duckworth, 1987) but see also the
debates on the Derveni papyrus between Luc Brisson/Glenn Most and Richard Zanko. For references and for a
discussion of issues related to Nietzsche see, Babich, “Nietzsche’s Philology and Nietzsche’s Science: On the
‘Problem of Science’ and ‘fröhliche Wissenschaft,’” in: Pascale Hummel, ed., Metaphilology: Histories and
Languages of Philology (Paris: Philologicum, 2009), pp. 155-201. Hummel herself in her “Hammer Philology
or How to (Meta) Philologize with a Hammer,” in Hummel, ed., Metaphilology, pp. 289-310, offers an account
of Nietzsche and classics, surprising and seemingly based solely on James Whitman’s “Nietzsche in the
Magisterial Tradition of German Classical Philology,” Journal of the History of Ideas 47.1 (1986): 453-468,
and including an extended review of James Porter’s books on Nietzsche and philology, fails to address these
issues in her reading, including indeed, the question of Nietzsche’s “singing” as opposed, significantly for
Nietzsche, to his “speaking” text. I emphasize the relevance of Nietzsche’s hammer, by contrast, as a musical
metaphor, and in this sense “sounding” out idols and connect this with his revolutionary discovery of the
pronunciation, i.e., the “musical sounding,” of ancient Greek. See Babich, “The Science of Words or Philology:
Music in The Birth of Tragedy and The Alchemy of Love in The Gay Science,” in: Tiziana Andina, ed., Revista
di estetica. n.s. 28, XLV (Turin: Rosenberg & Sellier, 2005), pp. 47-78 and the third part of my forthcoming
book on music and the politics of music, digital culture and Nietzsche’s idea of the spirit of music, Babich, The
Hallelujah Effect: kd lang’s Desire, Adorno’s Ghosts, and Nietzsche’s Beethoven [Popular and Folk Music
Series, Editor: Derek B. Scott] (Surrey: Ashgate, 2012 or 2013).
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See Babich, “Towards a Critical Philosophy of Science: Continental Beginnings and Bugbears, Whigs and
Waterbears,” International Journal of the Philosophy of Science. Vol. 24, No. 4 (December 2010): 343-391 as
well as, in German, Babich, “Nietzsches hermeneutische, phänomenologische Wissenschafts-philosophie.
Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen zu Altphilologie und Physiologie” in: Günter Abel and Helmut Heit, eds.,
Nietzsches Wissenschaftsphilosophie. Hintergründe, Wirkungen und Aktualität (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2012), pp.
291-311.
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See Alistair Crombie’s three volume Styles of Scientific Thinking in the European Tradition (London:
Duckworth,) and Hacking’s “‘Style’ for Historians and Philosophers,” Studies in History and Philosophy of
Science, 23 (1992): 1–20; pp. 178–199. Hacking’s reading brought Foucault into the mix but did not address the
historical limitations of analytic philosophy of science especially with regard to Duhem. For further discussion
including the relevance of continental philosophy of science, see Babich ““Continental Philosophy of Science:
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theorist, the serologist, Ludwik Fleck who used the term Denkstil where Kuhn more delicately
(and more politically, so I have argued) preferred talk of paradigms. 33
What has any of this to do with Darwin?
Well, at least morphologically speaking, rather a lot, especially in a German context. 34
But readings of the history of German (and other) ideas are themselves enormously complex and
not always soluble. The contrary assumptions is an Anglophone predilection and perhaps it is the
consequence of routine prejudice or what one calls, as victors in two world wars, “ideological
convictions,” and I say this with a good conscience while meaning at the same time to note its
dangers for scholarship or what Nietzsche himself would call science, Wissenschaft.
Nevertheless, such historical emphases, do not exhaust my reasons for bringing up the scientific
question of style. For Nietzsche, fond of style (the German word for stylizing, stilisieren, also
describes deception or prevarication), also wrote an enormously influential little essay, On Truth
and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense.
Only — to recall the kind of arch-philosophical distinction as Plato makes such distinctions in
the Republic, punning on a stone that is no stone (as a piece of pumice) in turn thrown by the
man who was (as a eunuch) no man, was pelted but was not pelted (inasmuch as the non-stone,
qua pumice, missed), at a bird that was no bird, etc. — Nietzsche didn’t write it. Nietzsche didn’t
write it, firstly, because he dictated it to his amanuensis Heinrich Köselitz. But, secondly,
Nietzsche also cannot be said to have written it inasmuch as he didn’t originally conceive it
either, if an original conceptualization or original “invention” is what’s meant by writing
inasmuch as much of the substance of Nietzsche’s On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense
Mach, Duhem, and Bachelard” in: Richard Kearney, ed., Routledge History of Philosophy: Volume VIII
(London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 175-221.
33

See for a discussion of style in Kuhn and Fleck, and further references, Babich, “From Fleck’s Denkstil to
Kuhn’s Paradigm: Conceptual Schemes and Incommensurability,” International Studies in the Philosophy of
Science, 7 1/1 (2003): 75-92.
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See, among other studies, Lynn K. Nyhart, Biology Takes Form: Animal Morphology and the German
Universities, 1800–1900 (Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 1995) many of which are
coordinated to certain accounts of German (as opposed to French) vitalism especially Goethe. See Robert J.
Richards, The Romantic Conception of Life. Science and Philosophy in the Age of Goethe (Chicago & London:
University of Chicago Press, 2002) as well as Richards, The Meaning of Evolution. The Morphological
Construction and Ideological Reconstruction of Darwin’s Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992)
and his ‘‘Ideology and the History of Science.’’ Biology and Philosophy 8 (1993): 103–108.
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was borrowed, even verbatim (as teams of scholars have demonstrated), from one Gustav
Gerber, the author of a very compendious book on Die Sprache als Kunst [Language as Art].35
But once one finds a whiff of plagiarism, scholars are off in search of other instances. And one
already has such other instances on hand. But this is another way to speak of the history of ideas
or what we today call source scholarship.
The point here is that and in fact one pretty much has to quote verbatim at least in some way —
this is the morphological issue of style I noted above with reference to Nietzsche’s own
discussion of this same topic in his inaugural lecture — just in order that subsequently scholars
can find and identify the source as such (by definition unattributed). 36 One can be more subtle,
one can emphasize another author one likes or does not mind or cannot help mentioning in order
to put folks off the scent. This last is what Darwin has been accused of doing and the list of
those Darwin fails to mention is capacious indeed, even if here I am only talking about, because
cognate in a metonymic way with Nietzsche’s Gerber, a pharmacist and ergo amateur
ornithologist, Edward Blyth.
Now Roy Davies who would not seem to be short of popular influence as a former BBC
writer/producer, is the author of a recent book that takes the rather standard charges of Darwin’s
plagiarism (standard since Loren Eiseley’s Darwin’s Century)

37

to a more specific height

writing on The Darwin Conspiracy: Origins of a Scientific Crime. 38 As noted, the notion of a
“conspiracy” is hardly new, if hardly accepted, and it derives from the charges, which
accompanied Darwin’s renown from the start: Darwin borrowed or stole from some
contemporaries and overshadowed many others. 39 Eiseley’s popular account (which is hard to
35

I list much of this literature and its complications in Babich, Words in Blood, Like Flowers: Philosophy and
Poetry, Music and Eros (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006).
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We all tell our students this to encourage them to go out and find a book and read it (in fact they simply go off
to the internet and pretend they have found and “read” said book).
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Loren Eiseley, Darwin’s Century: Darwin's Century: Evolution and the Men Who Discovered It (New York:
Anchor, 1961).
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Roy Davies, The Darwin Conspiracy: Origins of a Scientific Crime (Goldensquare: London 2008).
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Much of the debate turns on the use of terms like Blyth’s ‘inosculate’ a botanical term which Blyth has recourse
to and which appears, along with other indices, in Darwin. Schwartz, taking Darwin at his word, traces the use
to William S. MacLeay, Horae Entomologicae or Essays on the Annulose Animals (London: S. Bagster, 1819).
See Joel S. Schwartz, “Charles Darwin’s Debt to Malthus and Blyth,” Journal of the History of Biology, vol. 7,
no. 2 (Fall 1974): 301-318, here p. 312.
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better) has been updated for contemporary tastes in accounts like Peter Bowler. 40 But the notion
of conspiracy also follows on the very language of revolution and this is where the political and
historical philosophers come in the fray it is also where the philosophers of science find
themselves squaring off.
Hence Michael Ruse’s captivatingly titled Darwin Revolution: Science Red in Truth and Claw
tries to untangle the associated threads around the famous name of Darwin. What is patent is that
if Darwin meant to crowd out his competitors, as Davies for one, following Eiseley as well as
Bowler’s aptly titled, Non-Darwinian Revolution, argues, he certainly succeeded. But that
selective distinction would have been anything but natural (note that the aptly named ‘Darwin
awards’ assume otherwise).
Now because I read, among others, and in addition to Stegmaier and Richardson and Small
already cited above, my old teacher Wolfgang Müller-Lauter who has argued that Nietzsche was
inspired by Wilhelm Roux but also, as others like Gregory Moore have argued, Haeckel and
Virchow and and and, it seems to me that one cannot quite coordinate Nietzsche and Darwin and
leave it there, unless one does so in the spirit of the great man cult of our times. And this
resonant, quotable, memorable greatness is the point or heart of the Homer problem as Nietzsche
parsed it in his inaugural lecture. 41 We make claims as others make them, we read what others
read. This dependency and lack of originality is what Nietzsche meant by the epithet of “learned
cattle” his word for scholars — indeed for those same scholars as he wrote in his own
bibliographical auto-biography Ecce homo who accused him of being a “Darwinist.”
Like the actress Shirley Maclain and others who have been born before (not again and again in a
Nietzschean whirl that is the eternal return of the same that is because the same exactly
indistinguishable from the standing singularity of a one-time lifetime), it happens that everyone
is a Ceasar or a Cleopatra, as if no lesser-known human being had ever walked the earth. This is
40

See Peter J. Bowler, Non-Darwinian Revolution: Reinterpretation of a Historical Myth (Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1992) and again, Eiseley, Darwin’s Century. These are leading accounts, the older
now less so than the more recent. But see too, again, on the defence, Schwartz, “Charles Darwin’s Debt to
Malthus and Blyth,” and concluding for Wallace (or Darwin contra Blyth), Barbara G. Beddall, “‘Notes for Mr.
Darwin’: Letters to Charles Darwin from Edward Blyth at Calcutta - A Study in the Process of Discovery,”
Journal of the History of Biology, vol. 6, no. 1 (Spring 1973): 69-95.
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This is also the key to the joke to the epigraph that is the historian’s howler and delight in 1066 and All That.
21

charming in alternative or new age mysticism but it testifies to a lack of what Nietzsche called
philology (meaning science) and what we should call scientific scholarship, that is a lack of
philosophical research and reflection, but it is also and ultimately and the years make this worse
not better: a lack of history.
This means that we only speak of Darwin (as the new-age mystic was Cleopatra in a former life),
where we might speak of many others, I have already named (because he is so often
unmentioned) Edward Blyth, as well as Alfred Russel Wallace, and it is common to name Lyell
and Worster’s eminently readable Nature’s Economy, makes an essential case for including not
only Lyell but also Alexander von Humboldt as do others. 42 And here it is important to say and
to mean et cetera, and so on. But the intention falls short of the deed.
So let’s talk about Nietzsche. Like Darwin, I have noted Nietzsche too is accused of plagiarism,
that is borrowing, indeliberately or deliberately the work of others, and riding on this
thundercloud to the kind of fame, that like Darwin’s fame, eclipses others. In Nietzsche’s case
as in Darwin’s case, this has generated small satellite industries of what Nietzsche who had a
name for almost everything would call Ressentiment. I would put Schopenhauer among these but
also Max Stirner, and paradoxically also Wagner (for at least to the Wagnerian mind: Nietzsche
is imagined to have been in some way or another an ungrateful epigone), add to this on the nicely
New England side one Ralph Waldo Emerson and thence to the materialist and formerly very
popular (that is, so one supposes, until the Nietzscheans displaced him from his place of grace)
Albert Lange. 43 And so on.
Klaus Rohde argues, and it is my long ago background in biology — and as I write this I mourn
as I am currently teaching a course in ecological ethics, the death of a former teacher, Larry
Slobodkin44 — but especially in my enthusiasm for embryology and developmental biology
which allows me to take Rohde’s argument to heart, and allowing as one must for routine
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misconceptions (and when one says this one is opening the door to routine elevations of Darwin
to contemporary re-articulations and clarifications), that
Nietzsche’s views in fact coincide in key points with new developments in evolutionary
theory 1) the overall aspect of life is not need but and much more: abundance, opulence,
indeed absurd profuseness; 2) the process of evolution is not due exclusively to natural
selection (adapting to specific environmental conditions); 3) propagation is for sake of
the individual not the species; and 4) there is no general higher development, dependent
upon an inner drive to perfection (in this he agreed with Darwin). 45
Given what we have traced above as the jostling for recognition in the marketplace of ideas, we
recognize the elements of what we can be regarded as a kind of Darwinism of ideas and here too
it would seem that Nietzsche’s point — noting that it is not necessity and lack but abundance and
even waste — let us think of the salmon only our greed for energy have hindered in their
centuries long return to their spawning grounds (I mean to say that we dam the rivers and thus
prevent them from passing, and so damn ourselves to nothing but farmed salmon where ordinary
inbreeding and the diseases that are the ordinary results of breeding in captivity generate the
‘farmed’ salmon that are less and less of what fish traditionally were): but fish spawn to excess,
so too insect eggs, so too flowers, and so on. And ecological biologists repeatedly confirm that
this is the case, at least until the bull-dozers arrive on the scene.
So, some retort, that means that bulldozers are evolutionary pressures. And so too, one can add,
must be counted the effects of the use of carbon fuels (etc.), and of stray bullets in housing
complexes, or very intended bullets in the case of hunting: the same bullets that ensure an
acceleration of the effects of developing the African savanna, eliminating larger herbivores like
elephants and rhinos, that there will soon be, as there no longer are all the along the north eastern
seaboard any of the big cats formerly native to North America, and so too elsewhere go lions,
tigers, cheetahs, the mystically elusive and now very trivially vanished snow-leopard that I prefer
to call the ounce, etc.
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For a fee, for those wildly successful in business and wanting to share in the Harvard Club’s
display of stuffed trophy animals, one can shoot the largest and the best lion. 46 Natural selection
as long as it lasts. Fitness indeed.
If Robert Richards makes a Nietzschean point contra Darwin (without noting it to be sure, in his
Darwin and the Emergence of Evolutionary Theories of Mind and Behavior), he also emphasizes
precisely what Nietzsche does when he notes that the Darwinian who manages to find an
evolutionary basis for altruism is merely re-writing the history or genealogy of morals in another
fashion. 47 It should go without saying but Nietzsche is careful to parenthesize the point that the
same argument goes for selfishness or egoism.
Such a morality tale including ambition and competition turns upon the Darwin question, to
which we can add the Nietzsche question. What did Darwin say? (and if Davies and Eiseley and
others are right, we also need to ask about What Blyth said? and What Wallace said?). Here I
have been asking what did Nietzsche say?
I hope that I have shown in some way that it is not easy to answer questions such as these.

Coda: Nietzsche as Darwinist and the Problem of Transhumanism
I have above argued against the popular view of Nietzsche as Darwinist and I concur with other
Nietzsche scholars who have also noted that other authors worked in Nietzsche’s thinking in
association with Darwin, 48 not only Spencer and Malthus but also Roux and Haeckel among
others which also for Nietzsche included Empedocles and other ancient scientists.
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To the extent that a great part of the conviction that Nietzsche is to be associated with Darwin
stems from a particular and particularly infamous translation of a terminus that is historically
associated with fascism and which was itself and for its own part not quite Nietzsche’s own text.
I am speaking of the Übermensch, once all-too-dangerously translated as the superman, and
sometimes left for good measure in German, today more popularly rendered as the overman, or
post-human as I have named it or increasingly as the transhuman. The transhuman is popular
today in connection with the techno- or digital fantasies of those hoping to escape the world we
have made and ‘evolve’ instead (this is a projective evolution of the irreal kind that Baudrillard
named hyperreal or virtual) into so many World of Warcraft avatars, perhaps, or some other
social networking pretense (a facebook or Twitter picture will do) rather than flesh and blood of
life as we seem to prefer digital interaction and digital reality today. Yet the current longing for
a digital transcendence of the ordinary, what science fiction writers and tech investors call the
“singularity” is just another version of what Nietzsche called the latest instantiation of the ascetic
ideal. 49
In its original constellation, The Will to Power may be counted as Nietzsche’s most famous book
but [again think of Plato’s puzzles], this is a book that is not a book, as a concocted or invented
book, composed in several different instaurations and that means scope and articulation by
Nietzsche’s sister, Elisabeth Förster Nietzsche. 50 As Der Wille zur Macht, this book is also held
to be the causal factor in not only Hitler’s war but also the first world, which was also called,
instructively, fatally enough, “Nietzsche’s war” by journalists of the day as William MacIntire
and this should go without saying and I am repeating it again because it manifestly does not. One has no more
than positive proof that Nietzsche could have “read” (all of or just some part of? skimmed or studied) a book
featuring his marginal comments. Certainly so. But the lack of such “evidence” demonstrates not Nietzsche’s
innocence of the book but and only the book’s innocence of such markings. No more, no less. Just so, the lack
of positive records “proving” his knowledge of a given book, or the lack of mention in Nietzsche’s writings
does not allow us to conclude against his knowledge of the work in question, only that we have no evidence.
But having no evidence is not itself positive evidence. Darwin as we noted at the start, was common stock in
Nietzsche’s Germany, not least inasmuch as he had been translated into German. The issue of translation as we
have also noted this point above is key not because it facilitated the possible/plausible direct reading of Darwin
for Nietzsche but because Nietzsche’s own reflective terms are drawn from this same tradition of translation
(and the conceptual difference translation makes). Cf. Nietzsche BGE § 28. There is a reason Martin Heidegger
emphasizes that a translation is always also an interpretation.
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Salter already reminds us. 51 Thus speaking of the philosophy that generated the language of the
master-race, we are talking about the Übermensch as opposed to the Unter-Mensch as Nazi
terminology also speaks.
Nietzsche himself uses both terms. Yet as I have shown now, what Nietzsche means by the
Übermensch is satiric, adumbrated as it is via Lucian of Samosata, a just-about contemporary of
Diogenes Laertius, and an author who, like Diogenes Laertius Nietzsche alludes throughout his
writing. The primary (effectively the only) source for what we know of the Menippean satire
tradition to which Nietzsche also refers and which matters too given Nietzsche’s focus on the
parodic character of his Zarathustra.
If Recent scholarship inspired more by French than German or Anglophone philosophical and
sociological thought (such as Bergson, Lefebvre, Simondon) read Nietzssche as invoking the
transhuman condition (a conditional reference that is more Donna Haraway than Hannah
Arendt), their pro-cynbernetic vision moves in the direction if not of the robotic than the very
modest cyborg that is a kid texting a friend, a man masturbating with an internet connection, or
just contact lenses or a pacemaker, and so on.
But Nietzsche’s reference is not the present day paraphernalia of the tech stuff of our lives.
Instead he is talking about the human and the animal and as he writes he is not persuaded that we
are either “other” or “higher.” In this sense, one might want to consider the kinship with nature
than can make us accuse Nietzsche of a Goethean Naturmystik but and even there we miss the
point Nietzsche seeks to underscore with his notion of the Übermensch. 52
What Nietzsche takes from Lucian of Samosata’s Downward Journey or the Tyrant, is the
provocative contrast (as this belongs to what I call his reflection on perspective, not his
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perspectivism as the analysts say, but his perspectivalism: namely) between the values we have
given our circumstances in life, our culture and our tendency to take these values (shades of
Butterfield’s presentism) not only as universal but as timeless.
When Nietzsche writes that the human being is something to be overcome, or when he
characterizes the span of human life in a discussion of artists of grand passion as constituting “—
a hiatus between two nothingnesses —” (KSA 12, 473), he points to a perspective beyond the
here and now, one which asks us to consider not the immediate, whether in terms of economic
advantage or personal delight or pleasure, but rather the scope or scheme of the world.
Thus when Nietzsche writes The world is will to power and nothing besides he refers in his nown
context to nothing other than to the collective whole of existence in the cosmos. In this sense, he
has recourse to biological metaphors and from this same perspective he also emphasizes that the
aim of life is expression not survival (only, he says, rather unkindly, the Englishman strives for
life at all costs). Thus we have note Nietzsche’s emphasis upon the artistic play of life — not as a
drive common to starfish and to humans alike, or also and better said common to the morphology
of Haeckel’s radiolaria and human beings, at least as Leonardo displays them,
For Nietzsche as noted is speaking of what he calls the Urkünstler, which was to be sure what
the Stoics and the pre-platonic thinkers called mind or noûs. For his part, Nietzsche follows the
developmental schemes of Empedocles more than he does those of Darwin (and before one
dismisses this as the last word, as a throw away, wherever we turn to biological insights, we do
well to include their pre-platonic precursors). 53
If that be design, then Nietzsche must be aligned those who argue for intelligent design in the
sense then not of the Judeao-Christian God and not of Gaia but of another schema altogether, one
that Nietzsche once called aeon, reminding us that the child had kingship, ah, playing with
chance. 54
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And here, we might start again, with the elusive image of the necessary 500 hands needed to take chance or
τύχη by the forelock (cf. Nietzsche’s BGE §274).This paper was presented as the first listed of a series of papers
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